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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University Institute was created to 
further three main goals. First, to continue the development of the European 
University Institute as a fomm for critical discussion of key items on the 
Community agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to scholars 
of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual research projects on topics of 
current interest to the European Communities. Both as in-depth background 
studies and as policy analyses in their own right, these projects should prove 





















































































































































































Regional Trade and Foreign Currency Regimes 
Among the Former Soviet Republics*
Renzo Daviddi & Efisio Espa**
Abstract
The paper examines the problems arising from the adoption o f national currencies in 
former Soviet republics, and advances proposals to avoid excessive trade and output 
contractions. The move towards national currencies in many republics -  though 
politically unavoidable and economically efficient in the medium term -  is seen as 
having disruptive effects on inter-republican trade in the short term, with heavy losses 
o f incomes and employment, which add up to the costs o f market transition. Mutual 
convertibility among the new currencies could allow to overcome some o f the negative 
consequences on trade and production, while in the event o f mutual currency 
inconvertibility the effects on interrepublic trade could be disastrous and only some form  
o f payments agreement could reduce the magnitude o f the contraction. An intermediate 
currency regime which could sustain the level o f income and employment would be 
based on the use o f he Russian rouble as a regional means o f payment. Such an event, 
however, would require as a pre-condition the stabilization o f the Russian currency.
Journal o f Economic Literature Classification Numbers: F15, F31, F36.
This work is part of a project on the implementation of convertibility in Eastern 
Europe. The paper is the result of common discussion, although R. Daviddi drafted 
sections 1 to 5, E. Espa 6 to 9. We would like to thank, without implicating, P. Catte, 
M. de Cecco and D.M. Nuti for useful comments and suggestions.
Renzo Daviddi, European University Institute, 1-50016 S. Domenico di Fiesole (FI); 





























































































The political dissolution of the Soviet Union has raised a whole series of 
economic issues which the barely working Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) seems unable to cope with.1 The emergence of new states and 
governments meant the birth of different economic strategies and reform 
plans, with different timing relative to their implementation. However, in 
the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR, all the new inde­
pendent republics (NIRs) decided to remain part of a common currency area
— based on the Soviet rouble. The institutional framework inherited by the 
previous regime, mostly devoted to the management of a highly centralized 
economic system, resulted immediately inadequate to cope with the needs 
of the new “federal” system, with separate (and antagonist) power centres. 
In particular, at the beginning of 1992 it became very clear that the disci­
pline required to maintain an economic and monetary union, or even more 
flexible forms of collaboration, would have unavoidably clashed against the 
uncoordinated nature of the reform efforts in the various republics.
In the course of 1992, exchange of goods and services between the new 
independent states has been increasingly impeded by new trade barriers
-  mostly export restrictions -  in a context in which what had been 
considered domestic transactions, planned by a single central authority and 
involving the use of one money, became part of the foreign trade of each 
republic. Moreover, in the attempt to gain a higher degree of independence 
from the Russian Federation and to overcome growing shortages of roubles, 
an increasing number of NIRs issued new currencies or additional means 
of payments.
Trade relations among republics, however, remained based on the former 
Soviet industrial structure, characterized inter alia by an extremely high 
concentration of production in a limited number of giant enterprises. This 
led to the rise of heavy payments imbalances, and to a sharp contraction of 
interrepublic trade.
Similarly to what happened after the dissolution of the CMEA, all the 
ingredients for a collapse in economic relations between the new nations are 
present, with dramatic consequences upon production and income. The 
interdependence created in decades of central planning cannot be broken so 
suddenly without incurring unbearable costs.
This paper has two main objectives: to examine the problems arising 
from the trend towards the adoption of national currencies in the post-
1 For the purposes of this paper all the 15 republics emerged from the dissolution of the 




























































































Soviet states; to analyze and propose possible solutions to avoid excessive 
trade and output contractions.
In order to do so we start by reconstructing the main mechanisms of 
income redistribution in the Soviet Union (section 2). Three main channels 
are identified and discussed: the transfers linked to the Soviet budgetary 
procedures, the explicit transfers from the Union government to the periph­
eral regions of the USSR and the implicit transfers through the distorted 
domestic pricing system. We turn then to analyze the degree of integration 
of the former Soviet republics. In section 3 we attempt, with the help of 
some empirical estimates, to define more precisely the degree of economic 
integration of the republics. As expected, a number of indicators point to 
the fact that these economies are a set of strongly integrated systems. The 
potential and actual costs of the disruption of interrepublic trade are 
assessed in section 4. We show that the sudden shift away from trade with 
former partners place a heavy burden on the NIRs, which sums up to the 
costs of the transition. In order to preserve a level of trade compatible with 
the previous degree of economic integration, multilateral solutions should 
have been envisaged. Unfortunately, as described in section 5, the NIRs are 
so far moving in a completely different direction. Not only trade is being 
increasingly based on bilateral agreements, but we have witnessed the 
breaking up of the rouble zone, and the creation both de jure and de facto 
of separate republican currencies. Costs and benefits deriving from the 
introduction of national currencies are discussed in section 6, while in 
section 7 the recent experience of some republics in introducing a new legal 
tender is described. Solutions to avoid an excessive trade contraction are 
highlighted in section 8, where three scenarios are described, involving 
alternative trade and payments agreements among former Soviet republics. 
A few concluding remarks summarize the main findings of the paper.
2. Gainers and losers in Soviet regional policy
One of the claim often made by Soviet policy makers concerned their 
success in re-equilibrating income distribution at territorial level. Three 
mechanisms were at work:
Transfers linked to the Soviet budgetary process. The role of the budget 
in a federal state -  as the Soviet Union was considered until its dissolution 
-  is, among other things, that of transferring resources, in accordance with 
government decisions, to promote the development of particularly backward 
regions and to provide a more balanced distribution of wealth. Indeed, the 




























































































The “USSR State Budget” consolidated both the all-Union and the Union 
Republics budgets, as well as the budget of the State Social Insurance. The 
deficits of the republic were financed by the Union, by allowing a greater 
share of turnover tax to be retained by the Republics or by direct transfers. 
These rules basically remained unchanged until the dissolution of the 
USSR, despite attempts at decentralizing some of the decisions and to make 
local authorities responsible for financing their own expenditure, both at the 
Republican and local level.
According to Bahry (1987), the retention quota for the turnover tax 
varied significantly among republics, ranging at the beginning of the 1980s 
from 100% in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan to 48% in Russia 
and 43% in Latvia. Revenues from turnover tax retention represented over 
one third of income in Armenia, almost one fourth in the other Asiatic 
republics, and about one fifth in the Baltic republics.
Transfers (explicit) from the Union to the peripheral regions o f the USSR. 
Direct transfers from the Soviet budget were also a major source of income 
for the same regions. According to data reported in the study by the EC 
Commission on the Soviet Union (Commission of the European Commu­
nities, 1990, p. 150) unrequited transfers grew steadily from R305 mn in 
1975 to R5.9 bn in 1989. The recipient areas have been mostly the five 
Central Asian republics, with the exception of 1986 and 1987 when a small 
grant (a total of R278 mn) went to Latvia. Grants represented a massive 
contribution (about half) to the income of the Central Asian Republics.
Transfers (implicit) through the pricing system applied to inter-republic 
relations. The bulk of the transfer, however, was based on the price system 
governing exchanges between republics. As is well known, domestic prices 
in the USSR were heavily distorted. Trade balancing in domestic prices was 
not the expression of an “equal” exchange of goods and services among 
two republics, but simply an accounting device with no real economic 
meaning. So called “ soft goods” (foodstuffs, manufactured, services and 
part of chemical products) were overpriced, while hard goods (especially 
raw materials) underpriced with respect to world market prices of compa­
rable products. According to this principle republics producing energy and 




























































































3. The former Soviet republics: a set of strongly integrated economic 
systems
The Soviet economy was characterized by a high level of regional 
specialization and interrepublic trade. Regional policy in the former USSR 
aimed at maximizing benefits from economies of scale, and achieving 
integration between different areas.2
As shown in table 1, in 1990 the share of interrepublic trade on GNP3 
-  on average 29% -  was considerably greater than comparable data for the 
EC -  13.7%. Data in the table also indicate that inter-republican trade was 
by far more important than the exchange with the rest of the world. On av­
erage trade with other republics accounted for over 86% of total trade in the 
former Soviet republics, compared, for instance, with less than 60% in the 
EC. Moreover, for five of the fifteen republics it represented about 90% of 
the total, while trade with the rest of the world was of some relevance only 
for the Russian Federation. The data reflect the interdependence of produc­
tive processes taking place in the monopolistic environment of different 
republics, which, because of regional specialization, remained strongly 
dependent on outside inputs. With the exception of Russia and the Ukraine, 
regional trade represented about half of the income of each republic.
Intuition suggests a preponderant role for Russia in the commercial 
relations with the other republics. Available data allows us to verify the 
percentage of aggregate demand linked in each republic to exports to the 
Russian Federation.4 Results from the calculations are reported in table 2. 
On average in 1990 exports to Russia represented around one quarter of the
9
For a description of the regional economic policy in the USSR, see Schiffer (1989).
3
As will be discussed in detail below, given the distorted nature of Soviet domestic 
prices and the use of arbitrary criteria in the conversion of foreign trade prices (often 
misleadingly labelled “ world prices” ) into domestic prices, results should be interpreted 
as rough indicators. This is particularly true for all indices where income (either NMP 
or GDP) is used, given the necessity to convert import and export vectors valued at 
foreign trade prices into domestic prices.
4 A simple indicator can take the form:
EXRU- vmn
where:
XiR = export from the ith-republic to Russia 




























































































income of the other fourteen republics, and more than 30% for five of 
them. If we perform a similar exercise for the EC countries, with Germany 
playing the role of “attractor” , we obtain much lower shares (cf. table 3). 
On average exports to the FRG in 1989 represented less than 4% of the 
income of the other EC members. They constituted respectively 3.4%, 2.8% 
and 2.2% of the income of large countries such as France, Italy and the 
UK. The highest values obtained for EC members, the Netherlands -  14.4% 
-  and Belgium/Luxembourg -  13% -  is very close to the lowest value 
among NIRs, Kazakhstan -  12.8%.
At the same time, non-Russian Republics exports to republics other than 
the Russian Federation are also an essential component of aggregate 
demand of each state. On average in 1990 over 60% of each republic’s 
exports was directed outside Russia, thus excluding the possibility that a 
number of bilateral agreements between Russia and the various republics 
would be a viable substitute for a multilateral trade structure.
Proposals have been advanced to create preferential trade areas in the 
territories of some of the republics, e.g. the Baltic or Asiatic republics. The 
creation of such areas should reflect existing “preferential” trade links 
among a set of republics, and should indicate a higher (at least higher than 
NIRs average) degree of integration. Republics that are more integrated 
should present a high degree of openness towards the (group of) republics 
making up a possible preferential area.
Available data do not confirm such a hypothesis. The degree of openness 
of each republic towards the other fourteen has been calculated5 and results 
have been ranked in table 4 for the six main trade partners of each republic. 
The table shows three points very clearly. First, Russia is by far the main 
trading partner of all other republics. With the exception of Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, the “degree of dependence” is always above 50%.6 Two Bal-
5 Dividing the average trade of exports and imports by Net Material Product we have 
obtained a 15*15 matrix, in which each element ay represents the degree of openness 
of republic i towards republic j. The exercise has been performed using trade vectors at 
domestic prices, for comparability with income data. Alternative calculation based on 
trade flows valued at world market prices made the dependence on Russian market even 
worst for the other republics. Calculations performed excluding fuels re-equilibrate 
somewhat the picture, but did not alter the ranking.
6 The term “ dependence” may sound controversial here. Obviously there is not a one- 
to-one correspondence between high trade shares and the vulnerability of an economy 
to external forces. A proper indicator of dependence should take into account the 
sensitivity of a country’s current performance and future development with respect to 
international trade, i.e., assess the flexibility, the capacity to operate substitution of an 
economic system. All those elements, particularly relevant in presence of a regime 




























































































tic republics -  Estonia and Lithuania -  emerged as those with the highest 
degree of dependence on Russia, respectively 85% and 80%. Second, the 
Ukraine, and to a lesser extent Belarus, are the second main partners of the 
remaining republics, although the degree of dependence is much lower than 
in the case of the Russian Federation. Third, geographical proximity, often 
referred to as a main determinant of international trade does not seem to 
play a significant role in the case of NIRs. Data do not indicate neighbour­
hood as having a significant impact on the degree of interdependence.
In conclusion, the evidence reviewed above suggests a very high degree 
of integration among former Soviet republics, integration which, however, 
does not bear any relationship with comparative advantages of the indi­
vidual republics. The specialization pattern of observed interrepublic trade 
is the outcome of centralized decision-making, which corresponded to plan­
ning priorities, reflected decisions about the location of plants and failed to 
produce high levels of efficiency. On the one hand, the industrial structure 
inherited from central planning created an economic interdependence be­
tween republics which persisted after the erosion of central planning itself 
in the second half of the 1980s and which in the short term is going, at 
least partially, to survive even the rapid disintegration of the Union. On the 
other hand, the pattern of inter-republican trade observed under central 
planning is changing as a consequence of the dissolution of the USSR as 
an unitary state. A decrease in the degree of specialization, and a dramatic 
change in the division of labour among republics -  unavoidably linked to 
the process of disintegration -  is one of the main causes of trade decline. 
Moreover, the need to proceed towards a profound restructuring and mod­
ernization of productive capacity will increase demand for advanced 
technology and thus will reinforce trade links with developed countries, 
more than perpetuating the exchange of low quality products among former 
partners.7 Nevertheless, if minimizing the overall costs of transition is 
considered a policy priority, an abrupt reduction of interrepublic trade must 
be avoided in the short run, however irrational past trade flows were.
presented here.
7 Future trade pattern will depend crucially on assumptions about import elasticities with 
respect to prices. Import and export elasticities are a crucial element in forecasting future 
trade performance in the transition to a new market environment It has been suggested 
that for formerly planned economies significant response to price variations (or in its 
absence devaluation) will not improve the balance of payments, but only worsen terms 
of trade. On this issue cf. Nuti (1991) and the observations by Williamson in the same 




























































































4. Potential and actual costs of the disruption of inter-republican trade
As a result of the process of price liberalization, and with the intention 
to exert leverage on the other republics, the government of the Russian 
Federation has increasingly threatened an unilateral switch to world market 
prices and hard currency payments in interrepublic trade. Such a move, if 
effectively implemented8 *, would have a dramatic impact on a system of 
regional trade.
The potential costs of trade collapse in the NIRs have been estimated by 
Nuti and Pisani-Ferry (1992, p. 13 and table 4 therein). Assuming that hard 
goods can be sold abroad, the costs of trade collapse for each republic 
would then depend on its exports of soft goods which could not be sold on 
other markets. Results indicate very clearly that costs are relatively small 
for the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, substantial for the Ukraine and 
huge -  around 50% of each republic’s income -  for all other republics.
Similar conclusions are reached by Senik-Leygonie and Hughes (1992, 
p. 372), who suggest that a move to world market prices will cause large 
changes in terms of trade. While relative trade prices for the entire Union 
with the rest of the world could grow by as much as 50%, removing the 
enormous distortions which characterized interrepublic trade, especially 
increasing to world market level the price of energy and raw materials, 
would hurt all republics except Russia, Khazakhstan and the Ukraine. The 
authors conclude that because interrepublic trade is generally two to three 
times the size of foreign trade for the non-Russian republics, the shift 
means an overall deterioration in relative trade prices with the exception of 
Kahzakhstan, the Ukraine and Russia, which, however, will be the over­
whelming beneficiary from the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Indeed, the sudden and drastic curtailment of trade relations is already 
having negative effects that sums up to the recession provoked by the break­
ing up of the administrative system and by the harsh adjustment measures 
adopted in some countries of the region. The dramatic fall in export demand 
can also be seen as a major element depressing economic activity, although
8With effect from 1 January 1993, the Russian government has decided to sell oil and 
gas at world prices to the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
Georgia, and the Baltic nations. World prices will, however, be paid only by those 
republics of the former Soviet Union with which Russia does not have 
inter-govemmental agreements establishing special prices. RFE/RL, Daily Report, 
14.1.1993.
q
The authors consider soft goods finished manufactures, services, 50% of chemicals and 





























































































estimating the impact of the collapse of trade on output for individual 
countries is quite difficult. The lack of detailed data so far prevent a proper 
assessment of the impact of the collapse of interrepublic trade on output in 
1992. Results of calculation based on input/output tables for 1987 (Senik- 
Leygonie and Hughes, 1992, pp. 373-376) indicate that a reduction of 50% 
in both exports and imports with all the other republics, will account for a 
fall of national income ranging from 25% (Russia) to 42% (Turkmenistan).
Preliminary results for 1992 point to a reduction of Russian trade with 
the former Soviet trading bloc higher than 40% with respect to the previous 
year.10 If the Senik-Leygonie and Hughes estimates are correct a great por­
tion of income decline observed in the region in 1992 can be re-conducted 
to the trade collapse.
It has been argued that there are no economic considerations providing 
a justification for keeping the former USSR members in an economic and 
monetary union: the more developed republics would probably gain from 
leaving the union. For instance, Gros (1991, pp. 207ff) maintains that “ these 
republics would want to liberalize their economies faster, they would have 
a stable currency and they can expect to trade more with the outside world 
than with the rest of the Soviet Union once their economies are liberalized” . 
Even the possibility of recreating a customs union (or less binding forms 
of integration) between republics is dismissed under the assumption that it 
is not likely to yield economic benefits, and might actually be welfare- 
reducing because it leads to more trade diversion than trade creation.
However, the issue here at stake is not the creation or even the preserva­
tion of an existing economic and monetary union. Nor is even the issue of 
the maintenance of a rouble zone. Recent events, as well as theoretical 
considerations -  both discussed at length below -  are ruling out such 
possibilities. The question to be addressed is whether, in the short-run. the 
costs of the transition should be unnecessary increased by abruptly 
disregarding the existing trade links. The example of the former CMEA is 
indeed illuminating in this respect. Between 1989 and 1991 Soviet export 
to the CMEA declined on average by 17% p.a., imports by 11% p.a.. The 
direct effects of the collapse of exports in Central and East European 
countries may account for one half to three quarters of the their total output 
decline in 1990 and 1991 (Daviddi, 1992, pp. 273-276).11
10 Interfax, 21.12.1992, as reported by RFE/RL Daily Report, 23.12.1992. The EBRD 
indicates a decline in the volume of inter-republican trade of about 25-40% in 1992. Cf. 
EBRD, 1993, p. 22.
11 Similarly, such a reduction has exerted a negative impact (although more difficult to 




























































































5. The current trade and payments systems
The NIRs trade and payments system during 1991 and 1992 has been char­
acterized by three main features: i) the introduction and consolidation of 
restrictive measures -  imposition of export licenses and other barriers 
against mutual trade -  by individual republics in order to “preserve national 
resources” ; ii) a deterioration of the interrepublic payments system, mainly 
due to the spreading of bilateralism; iii) the introduction of new currencies, 
coupons, ration cards and quasi-monetary instmments, in an attempt to 
insulate the economies against negative effects coming from neighbouring 
republics, especially the Russian Federation.
A. Trade
In 1992 trade has been mostly carried out on the basis of intergovernmental 
agreements. Bilateral agreements included indicative lists of “ strategic” 
commodities that could be traded up to a fixed volume limit. The volume 
limits were calculated so that trade would be balanced if transactions were 
conducted at world market prices. In reality trade occurred at negotiated 
prices. Surpluses and deficits which emerged were cleared using hard 
currency or roubles at negotiated exchange rates. (IMF, 1992, p. 8).
Trade protocols followed the pattern of dividing trade into three catego­
ries: (i) obligatory list trade; (ii) “ indicative list” trade, and (iii) enterprise- 
to-enterprise trade. (Michalopoulos and Tarr, 1992, pp. 7-9).
The most important 100-150 products fell in the first category, for which 
an obligation of the state to fulfil the contract existed. Exports falling under 
this category were licensed and sold to specific enterprises in the importing 
country. According to the EBRD (1993, p. 20) trade volumes agreed for 
1992 were on average 20% lower than the previous year’s level. The “ in­
dicative list” trade was carried out on the basis of enterprise agreements 
defining sales conditions (including prices and credit terms). The products 
included in this category (1,000-1,500) were still subject to export licensing, 
in theory automatically provided, up to the amount specified in the protocol. 
Enterprise-to-enterprise trade was free of restraint, but apparently pertained 
only to products of minor importance.
As those clumsy procedures indicate, trade liberalization implicit in the 
regime change led paradoxically to an increase of administrative regulations 
of interrepublic trade. Moreover, the dissolution of the centralized system 
of planning and management made the actual fulfilment of those contracts 
rather uncertain. The agreements falling in the first category called for 
direct orders (state orders or goszakazy in the old Soviet terminology) to be 




























































































at a fixed price and with strict contractual obligations, especially under the 
almost hyper-inflationary conditions prevailing since 1992. Contrary to the 
old central planners, the new republic governments lack adequate admin­
istrative instruments to oblige firms to respect the agreements. During the 
first half of 1992 deliveries of many products fell short from meeting 
obligations included in inter-governmental agreements (Lupinovich and 
Malinka, 1992, p. 5).
Very often the response to unfulfilled deliveries has been the introduction 
of export restrictions. In 1992 all republics made widespread use of export 
licenses, partly also motivated by the existence of arbitrage based trade due 
to the lack of policy coordination, and particularly to the different timing 
and extent of price liberalization. This kind of restrictions added up to 
disruptions caused by supply problems and by political retaliation, while 
access to world markets appeared limited by the generalized shortage of 
hard currency.
B. Payments
The intention to retain the rouble as official legal tender was announced in 
Alma-Ata at the founding meeting of the CIS on December 21. 1991. The 
Minsk Agreement of February 199212 reiterated the willingness of the 
member countries to use a “ ... common currency unit (the rouble)... for the 
purpose of mutual settlements between the entrepreneurs, credit and other 
financial operations in the framework of the CIS” (Art. 2). At the begin­
ning of May 1992 some of the central banks of the NIRs13 established an 
Interbank Coordinating Council of the rouble zone. In the same occasion 
a resolution was passed to retain the rouble as the currency of the 
Commonwealth. Six republics (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan) formally reiterated in September 1992 
their will to maintain the rouble as only legal tender.
It became immediately clear, however, that the idea of maintaining a 
common mean of payments was little more than an illusion, given the lack 
of appropriate federal institutions and, even more importantly, of policy 
coordination among the CIS members.
First, the payments system resulted immediately grossly inadequate. 
Under the Soviet regime payments were cleared by Gosbank branches in 
the various part of the Union, through its network of cash settlement
12 The English version has been published as Appendix II in IMF (1992), pp. 30-33.
13 Lithuania, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan attended, but did not sign the agreement. See 




























































































centres. Following the disappearance of Gosbank at the end of 1991, 
payments settlements across republics became increasingly difficult. The 
IMF (1992, p. 9) reports that payments between enterprises in different 
republics could not be cleared directly between the cash settlement centres. 
Checks drawn on a bank in one republic could no longer be presented for 
payments in another part of the rouble zone. It followed that all non-cash 
interrepublic payments needed to be cleared through bilateral correspondent 
accounts at the central banks of the various republics, which, however, were 
introduced only at the beginning of 1992. In the second half of 1992 the 
extension of rights to finance imports to commercial banks (and through 
direct contacts among enterprises) complicated the matter further. Those 
cumbersome procedures strengthened the many shortcomings of the existing 
system and contributed to the disruption of interrepublic trade.
Second, the failure of the Russian stabilization program, and the 
irresponsible conduct of economic policy by many republican governments 
led to the de facto dissolution of the rouble zone and to the emergence of 
national currencies or quasi-currency. In particular three factors contributed 
to the collapse of the rouble zone: i) the shortage of roubles in most of the 
republics as a consequence of the lack of cooperation between the Russian 
government and the other republics; ii) the huge surplus that the Russian 
Federation accumulated vis-à-vis the other republics; iii) the existence of an 
incentive for the non-Russian republics to carry out a lax monetary and 
fiscal policy.
As we have seen, the predominant role of Russia as supplier of energy 
and raw materials makes it a stmctural creditor, with almost all the other 
republics as debtors. The cumulative Russian trade surplus amounted to 
R300 bn at the beginning of July 1992. Trade surpluses of this dimension 
represent a net drain of resources from Russia to the other NIRs, not 
coupled by a parallel building of assets.
The fact that at the beginning of 1992 the NIRs retained a common 
currency ruled out the possibility to use the exchange rate as an instrument 
of economic policy. However, membership of a currency area would have 
required a closer cooperation of economic policies between the member 
states, something that in the case of the NIRs remained only on paper. 
Indeed, not only the attempt to coordinate macroeconomic adjustment 
throughout the area has been extremely difficult, but even control of money 
supply has been impossible in practice. According to what has been 
identified by many authors as a classic “ free rider” problem14, in the 
absence of policy coordination, a state sharing a currency with other states
14 See for instance: United Nations (1991), pp. 85-86; Havrylyshyn and Williamson 




























































































benefits from running a budget deficit (financed in an inflationary way) and 
from allowing an almost uncontrollable expansion of credits. The inflation­
ary costs spill over to the other states, while benefits accrue only to the 
republic that misbehaves.
Although the central banks of non-Russian republics did not have the 
right to print money (the Russian central bank had the monopoly of 
emission and all the printing presses were located in the territory of the 
Russian Federation), in response to the roubles shortage and the squeeze in 
money supply imposed by the stabilization program attempted in Russia at 
the beginning of 1992, central banks in the other republics started issuing 
rouble credits to local commercial banks and through them to companies. 
In July 1992, the Russian central bank decided to limit financing for 
republican imports to the amount of roubles it had explicitly credited in the 
correspondent accounts to the central banks of the importing countries. 
Monetary authorities of the other republics had to start distinguishing rouble 
credits “backed” by the Russian central bank in the correspondent accounts 
and those which were not. Each republic basically ended up having its own 
rouble for financing transactions, thus creating a multiplicity of “ republic” 
roubles in the portfolio of the banks. A market developed where companies 
could buy the roubles they needed (i.e. Kazakh roubles for imports from 
Khazakhstan, Ukrainian roubles for imports from the Ukraine, etc.).15 In 
practice separate republic currencies have been introduced in this way, 
although not backed by any gold or hard currency reserves, formally still 
identical to the old roubles, and floating against each other.
It has been observed (Nuti, 1992, pp. 2-3) that the former Soviet Union 
is at present neither a rouble zone, nor yet a set of countries with 
independent currencies. A rouble zone would require that all monetary units 
be exchanged at a 1:1 rate. As we have seen this is not the case even in the 
republics which are still using the rouble as a means of payments. The area 
is characterized by a mixture of national currencies, parallel circulation of 
roubles and other means of payments and rouble-only regimes.
6. The trend towards national currencies
The move towards the introduction of separate currencies strengthened in 
the second part of 1992. Four republics (the three Baltic states and the 
Ukraine) have already managed to issue their own national currencies -  
respectively: the Estonian kroon, the Latvian lats, the Lithuanian talonas




























































































coupon and the Ukrainian karbovanets, which have completely replaced the 
rouble in the domestic monetary system. The talonas and the karbovanets 
-  which for a while circulated alongside the rouble -  are still conceived by 
national authorities as an intermediate stage between the abandonment of 
the rouble zone and the introduction of their true symbol of monetary 
sovereignty (the Lithuanian lit, the Ukrainian hrivna).
Three other republics have at present a domestic payments system where 
both the roubles and national means of payment (circulating in parallel) are 
accepted as legal tender. Such alternative means of payment have been 
introduced in Azerbaijan (the manat, which should gradually replace the 
rouble), in Belarus (the rubel) and in Moldova. Even Belarus and Moldova, 
however, have declared their intention to issue proper national currencies 
(respectively: the taler and the leu). Moreover, Armenia (the dram), 
Georgia (the marchvili or the moneti) and Kazakhstan (the tanga or the 
tumen) have made open their will for a future introduction of separate 
currencies. Thus, we are left with only four republics, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (where, however, part of the 
government deficit has been financed in 1992 with newly introduced 
coupons, see EBRD, 1993, p. 129), which in the short term will still keep 
the old Russian rouble as their own currency. Tajikistan is also planning for 
the future a currency change. Finally, it should be recalled that in more than 
one occasion even the government of the Russian Federation has mentioned 
the possibility of introducing a new currency as part of a renewed attempt 
to stabilize the economy.
The introduction of the kroon in Estonia is up to now the most relevant 
experience. Despite initial scepticism by the IMF (see Hansson and Sachs, 
1992, p. 2) the introduction of the kroon (on June 20, 1992) has been 
carefully prepared and has probably set an important example for other 
currency reforms to come. The kroon has been made internally convertible 
and pegged to the deutschmark (after consultations with the Bundesbank) 
at a 8:1 ratio, a level which has not been abandoned thereafter. The 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the Russian rouble was initially set at a 10 roubles 
for 1 kroon (a level corresponding to the conversion rate for most part of 
cash holdings and bank accounts). Roubles were not initially freely 
exchangeable into kroons, though this was indirectly possible through the 
exchange in hard currencies, whereas more recently the Estonian authorities 
have further liberalised the currency market. Only a few days after the 
withdrawal of the roubles from circulation the kroon started appreciating 
towards the Russian currency (see Zaleski, 1992, p. 445). Since then, the 
rate with the rouble has been determined on the basis of the cross rate 
between the rouble and the DM on the one hand and the pegged exchange 




























































































been backed by a stock of gold and foreign exchange reserves, and 
subsequently by an IMF loan related to an adjustment programme, which 
envisaged, among other things, a restrictive economic policy. The gold and 
foreign exchange fund has also been set up with the purpose of sustaining 
the currency’s domestic management through a currency board. An agree­
ment reached with the Central Bank of Russia -  though at the last minute 
-  aimed at avoiding excessive trade disruptions in the short run. The 
Estonian authorities agreed to surrender to the Russian government the 
roubles withdrawn from circulation.
The Latvian authorities have started the emission of the lats in early 
March 1993 with a rate of 1 lats to 200 Latvian roubles. The latter had 
been issued as a parallel currency in May 1992, and had become the only 
legal tender in July of the same year. The Latvian rouble had been initially 
exchanged at par with the Russian rouble, but from July to September 1992 
it appreciated vis-à-vis the Russian currency -  with which it is fully 
convertible, as well as the lats -  by some 40%, also showing a remarkable 
stability towards the US dollar, probably helped by the heavy depreciation 
of the Russian rouble. Both the lats and the Latvian rouble will circulate 
alongside each other for several months.
Similarly, the Lithuanian talonas was first issued in August 1991 as a 
coupon, with an initial rate of exchange of 1:1 towards the rouble, already 
increased to 1:2 in January 1992. The talonas became the only accepted 
means of payment at the beginning of October 1992. The Lithuanian gov­
ernment plans to introduce the lit later this year. A remarkable feature of 
the talonas is its internal convertibility both for current and capital account 
purposes. As in the Latvian case, there is not a currency board at work.
Finally, the Ukrainian experience is similar to the Latvian and Lithuanian 
ones, with the main difference, however, that the karbovanets is the only 
new currency which is depreciating faster than the Russian rouble vis-à-vis 
hard currencies. After its debut as a coupon, the currency became the only 
legal tender in October 1992, though the Ukrainian authorities still plan to 
issue the hrivna in the coming months.
7. Advantages and risks in the transition to national currencies
Before their spreading up in the republics of the former USSR, opinions 
differed on the balance between advantages and risks of issuing separate 
currencies. On the one hand, the IMF stressed the dangers for inter-repub­




























































































ill-prepared introduction of new currencies” (IMF, 1992, p. 12).16 On the 
other hand it was argued that national currencies would have allowed a 
better management of monetary policies in a context of increasingly inde­
pendent fiscal policies (Havrylyshyn and Williamson, 1991, pp. 38-39). To 
other observers (see for instance, Nordhaus, 1992, pp. 119-120), however, 
it was already clear that the difficulties in stabilising the rouble would have 
inevitably led to the rapid breaking up of the Soviet monetary space, i.e., 
of the rouble zone. In this respect, it may be useful to retain the distinction 
stressed by Williamson (1992, pp. 23-26) between a rouble zone and a 
rouble area. The former basically consists of a monetary space where the 
rouble is the only legal tender; the latter corresponds to an institutional 
setting where the rouble is the main regional means of payment and pos­
sibly also a reserve currency. On the basis of these definitions, there are 
few doubts -  as maintained by Nuti (1992, p. 1) -  that the rouble zone we 
were accustomed to know has definitively collapsed in the second half of 
1992, while a rouble area -  though of more limited dimensions and with 
different characteristics -  could still re-surface as a consequence of the 
preponderant role of the Russian Federation in the region and especially in 
the event of stabilisation of the Russian currency.
Several motivations can be singled out in the move towards independent 
currencies. Political reasons are highly relevant: a national currency is one 
of the essential elements that completes the achievement of national inde­
pendence and sovereignty. Both the relations between the new governments 
and the rest of the world and between the new states and their citizens are 
re-defined. The introduction of national currencies marks in the clearest way 
and, in a sense, makes irreversible, the separation of one country from 
another.17 A new currency is one of the strongest symbols of political 
legitimacy for a new regime towards its citizens, a visible move from past 
arrangements and ties. These motivations are clearly present in many of the 
new independent republics. Their desire to disintegrate has been much
16 For the reason that: “ the perceptions in republics of the separate currency issue -  the 
IMF noted -  do not generally embrace a comprehensive view of the monetary policy, 
exchange rate policy and institutional implications of introducing a separate currency” , 
1992, p. 12.
17 The reverse is also true: the move from national currencies to a single money 
weakens the distinction between different nations, as the reluctance by many Western 
European countries to abandon “ their”  money for the ECU or some other supranational 




























































































stronger than any other consideration stressing the economic advantages of 
sharing a common currency with a number of neighbours and partners.
In the former Soviet republics the introduction of national currencies has 
been a way to overcome the problems created by the shortage of roubles. 
Indeed, the need to dispose of cash instmments readily available have been 
a strong, driving force behind the haste to resort to additional means of 
payments other than the rouble.
However, the adoption of a national money in the NIRs rests also on 
sound economic grounds. First and foremost, a domestic currency managed 
by an independent central bank allows a more efficient control on money 
and credit aggregates than that exercised in the rouble zone by the Russian 
central bank. Moreover, given the absence -  or, at best, the rudimentary 
functioning -  of monetary and financial markets, the management of 
monetary policy extends to the design of fiscal policy, the financing of the 
budget deficit being virtually under the responsibility of monetary 
authorities. With an independent currency, stabilization measures can be 
carried out more speedily and efficiently given the possibility of a tight 
check on domestic money supply.18 Adjustment policies will be perceived 
as more credible by the population. This means that more politically 
legitimated governments and central banks will have a credit to spend when 
implementing tough stabilization plans.
Even in the long term the national currency arrangement seems superior 
to the maintenance of a rouble zone. The distribution of roubles by the 
Russian Central Bank to the NIRs according to parameters such as national 
income or regional trade shares, typical of the rouble zone, is an inefficient 
solution (except, as we shall see, in the short-term). Rules of this kind are 
too mechanic to take into account the specific needs of each republics, that 
is, of systems which will no doubt diverge, to a certain extent, from each 
other. In a period of deep institutional changes and in an unstable 
macroeconomic situation, a centralized monetary policy would require very 
strict provisions concerning credit creation, particularly in order to fulfil the 
anti-inflationary stance of monetary policy. Moreover, a centralized 
monetary policy could be carried out only if the Russian government is 
willing and capable to coordinate monetary and credit policies for the entire
18 According to Hemandez-Cata, (1992, p. 63) “ by controlling the rate of expansion of 
its own money supply, the country’s authorities could achieve a lower rate of inflation 
than that prevailing in Russia and other parts of the rouble area” . He also points out, 
however, ‘ ‘that given the size of the Russian economy, no former republic will be able 




























































































area and that the smaller republics are ready to accept Russian leadership 
on economic policy.
Second, the existence of a national currency allows much higher flexibil­
ity in the conduct of economic policy. The introduction of an independent 
currency -  coupled with structural reforms of the banking sector -  would 
be particularly relevant as an institutional channel for implementing central 
banks’ decisions. The autonomous management of the exchange rate helps 
to increase the openness and the competitiveness of the economy independ­
ently of the decisions taken by other NIRs. In a situation of increased trade 
liberalization the introduction of forms of convertibility would also allow 
the NIRs to import a meaningful structure of relative prices.
Furthermore, an independent currency permits the conduct of discretion­
ary trade policies: a devaluation, for instance, could avoid the strengthening 
of a protectionist trend, a circumstance which, however, seems especially 
relevant only in the long-term, i.e. when exchange rate adjustments will 
depend more on real competitiveness and not exclusively on the different 
degrees of (hyperinflation among NIRs.
Finally, a state beginning to issue of a national currency enjoys the 
economic advantages of seigniorage. On the contrary, in an economic area 
with different fiscal policies and with a single source of money creation, the 
advantages of issuing a currency would be reaped off only by the country 
in control of the currency emission. (Fischer, 1982).
The move from an integrated monetary space to an area of independent 
currencies presents also many risks and possible negative implications. 
Some of the potential costs are strictly linked to the appearance itself of a 
multiplicity of currencies. The spreading of national means of payments in 
an area formerly strongly integrated increases transaction costs and adds up 
to the impediments to the free circulation of goods, services and capital 
deriving from the disintegration process.
Other costs and risks are related to the way in which a new currency is 
introduced, and particularly to the timing such a move is carried out in the 
sequence of structural reforms. The decision to issue republican currencies 
has been so far taken in heavily deteriorated macroeconomic environments, 
characterized, among other things, by a dramatic output fall and almost 
hyperinflationary conditions. Under those circumstances the confidence of 
households and enterprises in the new currency can easily be undermined.
It can be argued that, as in several historical experiences, the introduction 
of a new currency could be a crucial component of an overall stabilization 
plan. This is only true, however, if the monetary reform is paralleled by a 
set of policy measures which properly address the causes of the instability. 




























































































and credit policies have been too lax, but also too little attention has been 
paid to the structural causes of inflation.
Three main causes of price instability can be observed in the NIRs. First, 
price liberalization does not limit its inflationary effects -  as implied by 
many advocates of shock therapy -  to the first months of its implementa­
tion. On the contrary, the recomposition of the structure of relative prices
-  which is, after all the final goal of a price reform -  is inevitably bound 
to be a long-term process, given its tight link with reforms such as 
privatization and demonopolization. Such instability -  coupled in almost all 
experiences with a clumsy and naive implementation of price liberalization
-  reinforces households’ and firms’ inflationary expectations. Price 
increases resulting from the process of reform could be purely inflationary, 
with the risk of the explosion of hyperinflation. However, it should be 
reminded that with price liberalization economic agents finally leam to deal 
with a less un-realistic, albeit unstable, price structure.
Second, fiscal imbalances deriving from the reduced tax base of the state
-  in turn due to negative real growth and privatization -  are generally 
financed in an inflationary way, as convincingly argued by McKinnon 
(1992. pp. 112-16).
Finally, once fully carried out, the liberalization of energy prices, 
especially if delayed, will give further impetus to price increases. Simple 
checking of credit and money supply is not enough to reduce price 
instability and to put an end to inflationary expectations. The introduction 
of a new currency in those circumstances is unavoidably bound to fail.
8. New trade and payments arrangements
The future evolution of trade among the NIRs will be affected by the type 
of exchange rate arrangements which will prevail.
Three main scenarios and related policy implications can be distin­
guished. The first assumes mutual inconvertibility and thus does not 
contemplate a complete move towards foreign currency liberalization. The 
second envisages the introduction of a new domestic currency, convertible 
vis-à-vis all the others. The third scenario analyses the possibility of the 
adoption of internal convertibility in the non-Russian republics, though 
limited to transactions involving the Russian rouble -  that is implies the 
recreation, on completely new basis, of a rouble area,19
19 It should be stressed here that this exercise will be carried out under the assumption 
that all NIRs (or at least the majority of them) do not create substantial impediments to 




























































































A floating exchange rate system is already emerging at regional level 
given the high rates of inflation presently characterizing all former Soviet 
republics. A regional exchange rate system based on fixed rates would not 
have in the present conditions any chance to last more than a few weeks, 
since the different rates of inflation would exert a very strong pressure for 
exchange rate adjustment.
A. Regional inconvertibility
In the first scenario the decision of postponing some form of current ac­
count convertibility would have disastrous consequences on interrepublic 
trade. Trade will be based on barter contracts and bilateral agreements 
would prevail. The exchange rate would still be administratively deter­
mined, but would give signals concerning the competitiveness of the econo­
my to the government (though black market rates could be more realistic).
As already suggested by several authors, an efficient solution to 
overcome some of the problems raised by regional inconvertibility would 
be the setting up of an agreement among the NIRs along the lines of the 
1950s European Payments Union (EPU).20 The functioning of a 
Republican Payments Union (RPU) has already been described with plenty 
of details: the two basic features of a RPU are a multilateral clearing 
system and the granting of mutual credit among the participants.
The need to devise multilateral solutions has already inspired the idea to 
create the CIS Interstate Bank among ten of the fifteen NIRs (excluded 
from the agreement signed last October are the three Baltic States, the 
Ukraine and Georgia). The draft Charter of the new bank (approved last 
December) clarifies the aims of the new institution. In particular, the bank 
should provide “ the organization and implementation of multilateral 
clearing services between national (central) banks of interstate trade-related 
and other payments and their final settlement” (Article II. 1) and “ short­
term credit extended among members of the Interstate Bank to facilitate 
settlements” (Article U.6). These features overcome the problems both of 
inconvertibility -  by assuring the transferability of currencies -  and, though
simply and realistically, to low levels of tariffs and trade barriers. Another strong 
assumption will be that all non-Russian republics will take similar decisions.
20 Cf. Bofinger (1991), Dombusch (1991), Gros (1991a); pros and cons of the 
application of the EPU mechanisms to Central and Eastern European countries are 





























































































partially, of the financing of the deficit vis-à-vis the Russian Federation. 
The latter, however, is quite a serious issue since it is hard to expect that 
Russia will indefinitely finance trade imbalances with the other republics 
given its status of structural creditor. The following months will tell us if 
the new institution will effectively take off or if it will be another purely 
formal and thus aborted attempt to promote regional cooperation.
As in the case of the proposals for setting up a Central-East European 
Payments Union, where similar problems arose, foreign intervention would 
be crucial. A payments union could only work if Western multilateral 
institutions provide the starting capital of the institution and they are ready 
to re-finance, if necessary, the deficit positions resulting after the clearing 
procedures have been carried out. Moreover, the granting of aid, soft loans 
or other concessional financing should be conditioned to the engagement, 
by the Russian government, of an advance of rouble credits to the NIRs. 
The advantages of this mechanism (inspired by the EPU’s conditional aid) 
would extend from non-Russian industries to the Russian government and 
exporters. Western aid would not be wasted and would serve a highly 
crucial purpose: sustain regional trade in the transition period and before 
convertibility is eventually introduced, without sacrificing those firms whose 
profitability could be preserved to the hardships of the transition and to the 
breaking up of the payments system.
B. Regional convertibility
This scenario envisages the introduction of new currencies, convertible at 
regional level. Usually, a basic distinction between internal and external 
convertibility is made in the literature. In the first regime, residents of each 
NIRs have the possibility of freely acquiring the amounts of republican 
currencies they deem necessary for their current account transactions.21 
The second one regards the possibility of allowing the free circulation of 
the new currencies outside the borders of the issuing republics.22 
Obviously, the move to regional external convertibility is sustainable only 
if it is based on the mutual acceptance of all republican currencies as 
regional means of payments. It should be reminded here that all 
Central-Eastern countries which have implemented significant currency
21 This also means that every NIRs’ central bank must hold fourteen different republican 
currencies in its official reserves.
22 This regime of regional external convertibility would then make, for instance, the 
Ukrainian hrivnia accepted by a Byelorussian exporter who would then get the 




























































































liberalizations have adopted the internal regime, thereby excluding the 
possibility of transactions involving the domestic currency outside its 
country of emission.
In both regimes importers and exporters would freely get the amounts of 
republican currencies they need for their current account transactions. 
However, regimes of internal and external convertibility practically coincide 
if countries belonging to a monetary area are to make their currency 
available to the remaining partners. As a matter of fact, the introduction of 
internal convertibility in a former Soviet republic means that the new 
currencies, in order to be exchanged in any other state, have to be 
externally convertible. In absence of capital flows, for instance, there is no 
way a Ukrainian importer could get Belarus rubels, unless the latter is 
allowed to circulate outside its country of emission.
The negative consequences on interrepublic commercial flows are 
generally supposed to be limited and in any case less severe than in the 
previous case. Even with the adoption of this regime, trade would 
undoubtedly contract because of rising transaction costs, of uncertainties 
surrounding the evolution of neighbour regions which have now become 
foreign countries, of exchange rate instability and of the ensuing possibility 
to use protectionist instruments. Exchange rates will depend on the 
difference in inflation rates -  in turn linked, as we have seen, to the 
different timing of stabilizations and price liberalizations -  to emerging 
macroeconomic fundamentals, and on the matrix of regional trade.
C. The new rouble area
In the two scenarios sketched above, the prevalence of trade flows towards 
the Russian Federation implies that the Russian rouble, if stabilized, could 
become a regional means of payment. Unless real domestic demand in the 
republics is widely slashed, the problem of financing the existing structural 
deficits vis-à-vis the Russian Federation would play a central role. The fact 
that the Russian Federation will not easily accept to be paid for its exports 
with republican currencies reinforces the likelihood of a wider role of 
the rouble.
There is thereby a real possibility that internal convertibility is introduced 
within non-Russian NIRs exclusively for the purpose of acquiring Russian 
roubles. This would correspond to the (re)creation of a rouble area. In 
addition to that, and especially in case of credible antinflationary plans by 
the Russian government, the value of the rouble would be determined in a 
wider market (with strong regional currency demand). The exchange rate 
of the rouble would then no longer depend exclusively on its evolution in 




























































































The possibility of setting up a rouble area on new basis depends above 
all on the willingness of the Russian authorities to allow a free circulation 
of roubles and the opening of rouble-denominated banking accounts outside 
its borders. The currency regime prevailing in the Russian Federation would 
then be a mix of limited internal convertibility towards hard currencies and 
external convertibility vis-à-vis the other republican currencies. Moreover, 
the Russian authorities would have to dictate the stance of macroeconomic 
policy to the other members of the rouble area.
A possible advantage of a Russian-led monetary area -  an event, 
however, at the moment far from reality -  lies in the fact that the rouble 
could play, in case of its stabilization, the role of the strong currency 
among the NIRs’ currencies, and thus help the other republics to contain the 
extent of monetary disturbances. Vice versa, as already discussed in 
section 5, the persistence of monetary disequilibria in the Russian 
Federation and the consequent heavy depreciation of the rouble towards 
Western currencies could undermine the attempt by non-Russian NIRs to 
stabilize their currencies.23 *
In principle, the recreation of a rouble area would highly simplify the 
regional payments system, though there would still be the issue of how and 
to what extent to finance the deficits vis-à-vis Russia. In the initial phase, 
deficits towards Russia could be financed -  as part of more general 
negotiations -  with part of the roubles withdrawn from circulation when 
implementing the introduction of the new currency (the percentage 
suggested by Williamson, 1992, pp. 25-26. is 10%. but it could be higher, 
considering also the advantages for Russian exporting industries).
D. Convertibility vis-à-vis Western currencies
The external regime of the NIRs has to be defined also with respect to 
Western currencies. Contrary to the experience of both the Estonian kroon 
and the Latvian lats, immediately declared freely convertible vis-à-vis 
Western currencies, a prudential attitude should prevail when planning to 
open up republican economies. With the exception of the Russian 
Federation, current account deficits characterize the relations between the 
NIRs and the West and hard currency shortage is still the rule in the region. 
Moreover, unless domestic inflation is brought to a halt, there is little 
chance to defend the exchange rate levels chosen as peg with hard 
currencies. It should also be stressed here that -  as it has happened in
23 Although, the heavy undervaluation of the Russian rouble might explain the stability
of the exchange rate of many republics’currencies vis-à-vis Western currencies, despite 




























































































Russia -  the thinness of foreign currency markets could abnormally amplify 
the depreciation of the currency, with significant repercussions on the 
determination of cross-rates.24 The spreading of distorted signals from the 
exchange rate to the domestic economy would nullify one of the main 
motivations behind the introduction of hard currency internal convertibility, 
i.e., the need to import market signals from world prices.
Western financial assistance could help in setting up a convertibility 
regime, but it would not be enough if the rise in prices is not significantly 
slowed down and if the risks of capital flights are not minimized by more 
stable macroeconomic conditions.25
E. Policy implications
There are a number of policy implications which need to be stressed at this 
point. In order to be a stabilizing factor, and not a channel for the 
amplification of imbalances, the introduction of a new currency must satisfy 
some important conditions. The presence of a central bank is the first 
fundamental element, better if the degree of autonomy from the government 
is very high.26 Second, a rigorous control on money and credit creation 
seems of the utmost relevance. Until the implementation of a government 
bond market gives more flexibility to monetary policy and in view of the 
fragile conditions of the current account balance there are few doubts that 
monetary (and fiscal) policies should be of a restrictive character. Third, the 
CIS republics, Georgia and possibly also the Baltic states should proceed 
to some form of coordination of their most important reforms, in order to 
decrease the degree of overall imbalances. The West has all the financial 
weapons -  especially conditional lending, not necessarily of the IMF-type 
-  to convince the countries concerned of this necessity, although we are 
perfectly aware that the rouble zone collapsed exactly for the NIRs un­
willingness to coordinate their economic policies. However, experience tells
24 On the consequences of the thinness characterizing the Russian currency markets, see 
Daviddi, Espa and Uvalic (1992).
25 In the Russian Federation capital flights were estimated in 1992 at some $13-15 bn. 
The presence of uncertainty and the increase of capital flights has also prevented the 
granting of the G24 $6 bn rouble stabilization fund. According to M. Camdessus, if the 
fund had been granted, “ a few days afterwards the $6 bn would have been in an account 
in Paris, Geneva, London or Zurich” . IMF Survey, February 22, 1993, pp. 51-52.
26 It should be remembered, however, that under specific circumstances too much 
independence could be harmful, as the recent Russian experience of a reforming 




























































































us that coordination is no panacea at all if fundamentals between countries 
are divergent or if speculative forces are able to dominate the market.
As repeatedly stressed in the previous pages the need to stabilize the 
rouble is a necessary condition for the success of any kind of agreement 
among the NIRs. Therefore, a more serious attempt should be made to 
stabilize it. Assuming that the Russian currency is under firm control, and 
if some form of coordination is achieved, an EMS-type of exchange rate 
mechanism should be devised; oscillation bands would be wide and 
realignments possible. Finally, in case of regional inconvertibility a 
payments -  or at least a clearing -  union should be devised, along the lines 
already indicated.
We are convinced, however, than those republics which have not yet 
issued their own currency should better wait and postpone their plans of 
monetary sovereignty. As argued elsewhere (Daviddi and Espa, 1992b), it 
seems more convenient to absorb the present inflationary tensions -  and the 
ones likely to come from further increase of energy prices -  with the old 
currency. Otherwise, the new currency could be rapidly wiped out by 
runaway inflation. This reasoning could also apply to republics which are 
in the transitory stages of their currency reforms.
The new currency, as already mentioned, can and indeed should be used 
-  like in several monetary reforms of the past -  as an instrument in the 
process of economic adjustment. Together with other stabilization measures, 
the introduction of a new currency would give households and entrepre­
neurs a clear sign of change.
9. Conclusions
In this paper we have maintained that the move towards national currencies 
in many independent republics of the former Soviet Union -  though politi­
cally unavoidable and economically efficient in the long term -  is having 
disruptive effects on interrepublic trade. In the short term, heavy losses of 
income and employment derive from the neglect of the high level of econo­
mic interdependence among former Soviet republics, from the dissolution 
of the Union and the disappearance of its re-distributive mechanisms. Costs 
are increased by the adoption of adjustment programs in most republics and 
by the parallel undertaking of structural reforms.
In this context, the introduction of national currencies can be undermined 
by conditions of structural inflation. For this reason we suggested that 
decisions concerning the introduction of new currencies should be 




























































































respect the birth of new legal tenders in the republics could be an essential 
component of the stabilization program.
If other considerations prevail and, as in the current experience in the 
former USSR, national currencies are introduced, then the presence of 
mutual convertibility among them could allow to overcome the most nega­
tive consequences on trade and production deriving from their adoption. 
However, a process of too fast opening up of the economy could be costly 
and unsustainable, and require the adoption of strongly deflationary 
economic policies.
An intermediate regime which could help to sustain the level of income 
and employment would be based on the use of the Russian rouble as a 
regional currency. Such a move, however, implies the exit of the Russian 
economy from its present almost hyperinflationary conditions. This is also 
why Western financial efforts should be, first o f all, directed to stabilize 
the rouble.
If the republics fail to co-operate or the rouble is not stabilized, future 
developments may be rather worrying. The effects of mutual inconvertibility 
on interrepublic trade could be disastrous and only some form of payments 
agreement could reduce the magnitude of output and income contraction. 
Although other issues would still remain on top of the agenda of reforms, 
above all the coordination of stabilization plans and structural reforms, a 
payment union would give some breathing space, necessary for the 
implementation of longer-term undertakings such as privatization, industrial 
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Table 1. Total and inter-republican trade (l) as percentage of GNP in 1990
Republic Foreign trade
Total Inter-republican Share of inter­
republican on total 
trade
Russian Federation 18.3 11.1 60.7
Ukraine 29.0 23.8 82.1
Belarus 47.3 41.0 86.7
Uzbekistan 28.5 25.5 89.5
Kazakhstan 23.5 20.8 88.5
Georgia 28.9 24.8 85.8
Azerbaijan 33.9 29.8 87.9
Lithuania 45.5 40.9 89.9
Moldova 33.0 28.9 87.6
Latvia 41.4 36.7 88.6
Kyrgyzstan 32.2 27.7 85.8
Tajikistan 35.9 31.0 86.4
Armenia 28.4 25.6 90.1
Turkmenistan 35.6 33.0 92.7
Estonia 32.9 30.2 91.8
Average 33.0 28.7 86.3
re: EC average 23.1 13.7 59.2
(1) Trade is measured by the average of exports and imports as percentage of GNP
<2) Inter-republican trade as percentage of total trade
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Narodnoe Khozyaistvo for the CIS states and 




























































































Table 2. Export to Russia as percentage of Net Material Product in 1990
Republic Export Net Material Prod­
uct
Export/NMP
Ukraine 25248.6 117992.4 21.4
Belarus 9938.3 29509.7 33.7
Uzbekistan 4840.2 23603.0 20.5
Kazakhstan 4276.3 33361.6 12.8
Georgia 3557.9 10865.7 32.7
Azerbaijan 3705.2 10712.3 34.6
Lithuania 2707.4 9999.9 27.1
Moldova 3488.8 9442.7 36.9
Latvia 2512.5 8849.3 28.4
Kyrgyzstan 897.1 6026.5 14.9
Tajikistan 1167.6 5489.8 21.3
Armenia 1851.2 6976.6 26.5
Turkmenistan 1276.4 5321.4 24.0
Estonia 1816.2 5469.1 33.2
Total 67283.7 283620.0 23.7

































































































Denmark 4.6 95.1 4.9
Greece 1.6 49.2 3.2
Spain 4.9 345.2 1.4
France 29.3 870.3 3.4
Ireland 2.1 30.8 6.9
Italy 21.7 786.5 2.8
Netherlands 29.3 203.2 14.4
Portugal 1.9 41.1 4.5
United Kingdom 16.4 760.3 2.2
Total 130.6 3327.1 3.9
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